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NORMING IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
JONATHAN S. MASUR & ERIC A. POSNER† 
ABSTRACT 
  How do regulatory agencies decide how strictly to regulate an 
industry? They sometimes use cost-benefit analysis or claim to, but 
more often the standards they invoke are so vague as to be meaningless. 
This raises the question whether the agencies use an implicit standard 
or instead regulate in an ad hoc fashion. We argue that agencies 
frequently use an approach that we call “norming.” They survey the 
practices of firms in a regulated industry and choose a standard 
somewhere within the distribution of existing practices, often no higher 
than the median. Such a standard burdens only the firms whose 
practices lag the industry. We then evaluate this approach. While a case 
can be made that norming is appropriate when a regulatory agency 
operates in an environment of extreme uncertainty, we argue that on 
balance norming is an unwise form of regulation. Its major attraction 
for agencies is that it minimizes political opposition to regulation. 
Norming does not serve the public interest as well as a more robust 
standard like cost-benefit analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A furious debate about how government agencies should regulate 
when they are authorized to do so under general statutory mandates 
has mostly neglected the question of how agencies do regulate. The two 
questions are different, of course. The “should” question has focused 
in recent years on the role of cost-benefit analysis, with scholars taking 
sides pro or con, and some scholars advocating other standards like 
feasibility analysis.1 In this debate, scholars cite agency regulatory 
impact statements (“RIAs”), related materials, and judicial opinions, 
but mainly do so in order to criticize or defend the agencies’ 
explanations for their regulations. They do not usually question the 
agencies’ explanations or try to figure out the real determinants of 
agency action. 
A smaller literature looks at what agencies do. Some scholars 
provide detailed case studies that report and evaluate the reasoning 
used by agencies.2 Others have produced studies that evaluate agency 
 
 1. See generally, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING 
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) (advocating for feasibility 
analysis or other alternatives to cost-benefit analysis); MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, 
NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006) (arguing in favor of cost-benefit 
analysis); RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 
(2011) (same); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION (2018) (same).  
 2. See generally, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO 
SAFETY (1990) (providing a comprehensive account of the NHTSA’s process in regulating 
automobile safety); W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK (1992) (describing different approaches to risk regulation); Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255 (2002) (describing the EPA’s decision-
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regulations in aggregate to see if they generate benefits or costs, with 
mixed results.3 Another strand of the literature focuses on the impact 
of political influences on agencies.4 But there is little attention given to 
how agencies decide whether to regulate, and—of particular interest to 
us—how they decide on the level of regulatory strictness once they 
have decided to regulate. 
In this Article, we suggest that agencies often use a distinctive style 
of decision-making, which we call “norming.” A norm is “a set standard 
of development or achievement usually derived from the average or 
median achievement of a large group.”5 We convert the noun into a 
verb to capture what we think agencies are doing. In deciding how strict 
to make a regulation, agencies may choose a level of strictness that puts 
significant burdens on industry outliers—the firms with the worst 
practices—while putting limited burdens or none at all to the firms 
whose practices are of average quality or better. We call this practice 
“norming” because it allows the statistical norm—reflecting the actual 
practices of industries—to provide the source of the regulatory 
standard. This has the effect of truncating the distribution at the low-
quality end. 
While agencies do not use the word “norming” to describe their 
decision-making procedures, we show that they often engage in this 
behavior. In some cases, a statute directs an agency to engage in 
norming. In other cases, agencies have interpreted statutes to allow or 
require them to engage in norming. And in still other cases, agencies 
seem to engage in norming in tandem with other approaches, like 
feasibility analysis or cost-benefit analysis. 
After providing background in Part I, we document several 
instances of norming in Part II. Our goal is not to survey agency 
behavior exhaustively but to persuade the reader that norming is a 
 
making process in regulating arsenic in drinking water); see also Caroline Cecot & W. Kip Viscusi, 
Judicial Review of Agency Benefit-Cost Analysis, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 575, 575 (2015) 
(discussing judicial review of cost-benefit analyses). 
 3. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Patrick Dudley, How Well Does the Government Do Cost-
Benefit Analysis? (AEI-Brookings Inst. Working Paper No 04-01, 2004) (examining 74 cost-
benefit analyses of federal environmental regulations and finding varied quality). 
 4. See, e.g., GEORGE J. STIGLER, CHICAGO STUDIES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1988) 
(compiling Chicago school scholarships about the political process); Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean 
Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q.J. 
ECON. 1089, 1089 (1991) (describing the relationship between agencies and interest-group 
politics). 
 5. Norm, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/norm 
[https://perma.cc/F2FP-EN9H].  
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sufficiently important agency practice to deserve scholarly and public 
attention. In Part III, we evaluate norming from the standpoint of the 
public good. Agencies often engage in norming, but should they? An 
argument can be made that norming is a reasonable way to proceed 
when regulators are highly uncertain about best practices, but we argue 
that cost-benefit analysis is the better approach. The problem with 
norming is that often even the average or high-quality practices within 
an industry cause harm to the public, justifying a regulatory response. 
We suggest that the major reason for norming is that it is politically 
attractive. Industry opposition to regulation is often intense, but when 
the burden of regulation falls on only the worst firms, the industry may 
not be opposed to it. The leading firms in the industry may even 
support the regulation because the outliers harm the reputation of the 
industry or pose costly threats to the dominance of the stronger firms. 
Finally, in Part IV, we further illustrate the attraction and limitations 
of norming by discussing instances in which courts have engaged in 
norming. The most familiar example comes from the jurisprudence of 
the Eighth Amendment, which requires courts to strike down 
punishments that are, in terms of harshness, outliers from the statistical 
distribution represented by the states. 
I.  REGULATORY STANDARDS AND DECISION PROCEDURES 
A. Legal Standards 
When Congress creates administrative agencies and gives them 
directions, it usually uses broad language that is susceptible to multiple 
interpretations. For example, one section of the Clean Air Act, which 
governs emissions from power plants, instructs the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) to issue regulations that are “appropriate 
and necessary.”6 The language means not only that the EPA should 
issue regulations when appropriate and necessary, but also that the 
strictness of a regulation should be “appropriate and necessary.”7 
Anytime an agency regulates, it must choose a level of strictness, and 
that level could range from zero or de minimis, to extreme—in this 
case, for example, mandating an emission level of zero, which would 
destroy the power industry. Congress evidently wanted the EPA to 
avoid both extremes but gave no guidance as to how strict the 
 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012). 
 7. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2705 (2015). 
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regulation should be, within the vast range between de minimis and 
maximal. 
In other cases, Congress provided more concrete instructions 
while still leaving much to the agency’s discretion. For instance, one 
section of the Clean Water Act instructs the EPA to mandate the “best 
technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact.”8 
This language is less vague than “appropriate and necessary,” but it 
still leaves much in doubt. Is the “best” technology the most effective 
(i.e., cleanest) technology, or the most efficient (i.e., cost-effective) 
technology? For a technology to be “available,” must it already be in 
use, or can it be on the drawing board? And so forth.9 
Agencies address these ambiguities by offering interpretations or 
relying on decision procedures, which are reported in various 
regulatory documents. Under the Chevron doctrine, courts accept 
reasonable interpretations.10 The courts have sanctioned regulations 
based on cost-benefit analysis as well as regulations based on other 
types of methodologies.11 However, the fact that an agency has legal 
authority under Chevron to select a particular level of regulation does 
not mean that the level of regulation it selected was well chosen. 
Agencies have been criticized frequently both for excessively strict and 
insufficiently strict regulation.12 These criticisms are often based on 
cost-benefit analyses, which evaluate regulations by comparing the 
burden on industry or consumers with the monetized benefits the 
regulations sought to achieve. In an effort to remedy this problem, a 
succession of presidents (beginning with Reagan and extending 
through Obama and Trump) have required most agencies to produce 
 
 8. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b). 
 9. The administrative state is far too vast, and the various regulatory statutes far too 
numerous, for us to canvas even a small portion of them here. For a partial catalog of major 
regulatory provisions which highlights the many variations in regulatory language see Jonathan 
S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 
982–86 (2018) [hereinafter Masur & Posner, Judicial Role]. 
 10. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) 
(explaining the doctrine); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 
U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 658, 668–70 (2010) [hereinafter Masur & Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis] 
(discussing the relationship of courts to different types of analysis). 
 11. See Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 2, at 578 (documenting judicial deference to agency cost-
benefit analysis); Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 
1355, 1359 (2016) (documenting cases in which courts have been deferential to agency choice of 
methodology). 
 12. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 197–240 (1982) (discussing 
examples of over- and underregulation in the areas of trucking, rent control, and environmental 
pollution). 
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cost-benefit analyses each time they promulgate regulations with 
economic impacts of more than $100 million per year.13 This 
requirement has become entrenched.14 
The fact that agencies are required to perform cost-benefit 
analysis when regulating does not mean that they always use cost-
benefit analysis to decide how stringently to regulate. In some cases, 
statutes appear to bar the agencies from relying on a cost-benefit 
analysis.15 Moreover, even when they use cost-benefit analysis, often 
different levels of regulatory strictness may all be consistent with a 
cost-benefit standard. Accordingly, agencies have typically relied upon 
a number of different decision procedures or methodologies for 
selecting regulatory standards, which we describe below.16 
B. Decision Procedures 
Cost-benefit analysis. Under a cost-benefit analysis, an agency 
issues a regulation if the benefits exceed the costs. The costs typically 
include the expense of compliance, which may involve installing safety 
devices, training workers, and discontinuing production methods—
capital and labor expenses borne by industry and passed on to 
consumers as higher prices, shareholders as lower returns, and workers 
as lower wages or layoffs. The benefits typically involve improvements 
in public health, safety, convenience, and other forms of well-being. 
The major virtue of cost-benefit analysis is that if, as is often claimed, 
the regulator’s goal is to improve public welfare, the decision 
procedure enables the agency to identify all aspects of public welfare 
that the regulation might affect, and provides a straightforward means 
for evaluating it. 
The simple formulation masks numerous complexities and 
problems, both normative and methodological—the topic of a vast 
literature.17 We will not rehearse these problems here, except to note 
 
 13. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981). 
 14. See Masur & Posner, Judicial Role, supra note 9, at 944 (observing that statutes almost 
always direct regulators to consider the costs and benefits of regulations). 
 15. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 486 (2001) (holding that the 
statute prohibits the EPA from considering costs in rulemaking). 
 16. See generally, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 1 (discussing decision-making 
procedures that agencies rely on and comparing them to cost-benefit analysis); JAMES 
MCCARTHY & CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41561, EPA REGULATIONS: 
TOO MUCH, TOO LITTLE, OR ON TRACK? (2016) (describing major EPA regulatory actions 
involving a variety of methodologies discussed infra Part I.B).  
 17. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 1, at 37–40 (noting that cost-benefit 
analysis tends to overestimate the costs of regulations); John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis 
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one of them that is relevant to our current topic. Because of the 
complexity of the economy and human behavior, it is often difficult to 
determine whether an incremental increase in the stringency of a 
regulation will produce more net benefits or more net costs. Agencies 
that demand a high degree of certainty before regulating may thus end 
up regulating too little, while agencies that forge ahead despite 
uncertainty are often accused of recklessness. For the same reason, 
agencies may find it difficult to defend reasonable but speculative 
judgments when their regulations are challenged in court.18 
Feasibility analysis. Because some statutes require agencies to 
implement regulations where “feasible,” an idea has developed that 
agencies should conduct “feasibility analysis,” which means that the 
agency should regulate as strictly as possible short of driving firms or 
industries out of business.19 Agencies that conduct feasibility analysis 
sometimes try to predict a regulation’s effect on unemployment within 
the industry, and they curtail regulation if the predicted effect seems 
excessive; at other times, they try to predict how many firms will be 
driven into bankruptcy, and again curtail regulation if the number 
seems too large.20 
Feasibility analysis is, in principle, a simpler and more manageable 
procedure than cost-benefit analysis because the regulator does not 
need to evaluate all the effects of a regulation, only some of them. But 
this is also the chief objection to feasibility analysis. Because consumers 
and investors incur costs from regulation, and their well-being is part 
of the public good, their losses should be taken into account by the 
agency.21 Other problems with feasibility analysis include its focus on 
 
of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 882 (2014) (pointing 
out accuracy problems with using cost-benefit analysis); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for 
Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 351 (2014) (detailing the 
problems of applying cost-benefit analysis to financial regulations). 
 18. See generally Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the 
Problem of Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 86 (2015) [hereinafter Masur & 
Posner, Unquantified Benefits] (discussing this point); Amy Sinden, The Problem of Unquantified 
Benefits (Dec. 17, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3087370 [https://perma.cc/XQ7Z-SWDK] (finding that EPA excluded identified 
benefits from many CBAs due to data limitations). 
 19. See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety 
Regulation: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 1, 1 (2005) (explaining the benefits and application of the feasibility principle). 
 20. See Masur & Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, supra note 10, at 657 (describing two 
such regulations).  
 21. Id. at 682–84. But see David M. Driesen, Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation: A Modest 
Response to Masur and Posner, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 318–20 (2011) (providing 
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business failure (which is not necessarily bad), and the ambiguity of the 
regulatory standard. 
Narrow tradeoffs. In some cases, agencies focus on a few of the 
most important and salient effects of regulations while ignoring 
others.22 Consider, for example, a regulation that approves a 
pharmaceutical. The drug might reduce the risk of one bad outcome 
(including death) but also create risks of others. In risk-risk analysis, as 
this mode of analysis is sometimes called, the agency evaluates a 
regulation according to its impact on a narrow range of severe risks 
(death or serious injury or illness) while ignoring other effects on well-
being, which may be difficult to quantify. 
Like feasibility analysis, risk-risk analysis neglects many of the 
welfare effects of regulation. Risk is not the only thing that matters; so 
does, for example, the price tag on an automobile. 
Quality-adjusted life years and cost-effectiveness analysis. In 
healthcare regulation, an ambitious effort has been made to evaluate 
medical procedures according to how much they extend life, adjusted 
by quality.23 The approach reflects the intuition that a medical 
procedure that extends life by ten years without alleviating suffering 
might be worse than an alternative medical procedure that extends life 
by eight years but does alleviate suffering. The quality-adjusted life 
years (“QALY”) approach is meant to reflect that individuals often 
prefer the second procedure to the first. Since cost remains a 
consideration—hospitals cannot spend an infinite amount of money on 
medical procedures—but is not directly included in the analysis, this 
type of procedure is a type of cost-effectiveness analysis. On this 
approach, the question is: Given a budget, how is that budget best spent 
to advance well-being? A virtue of this approach is it avoids the 
problems of monetization. The defect is that a budget must be 
determined, and it is hard to see how the agency (or Congress) can 
determine the budget in the first place without performing cost-benefit 
analysis or another form of welfare analysis. 
Break-even analysis. Sometimes an agency is able to estimate the 
costs of a regulation but not the benefits; or, on rare occasions, the 
 
normative justifications for feasibility analysis). 
 22. Jonathan Baert Wiener & John D. Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS 
RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 226, 228–29 (John D. 
Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995).  
 23. See Matthew D. Adler, QALYS and Policy Evaluation: A New Perspective, 6 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 1, 12–15 (2006) (discussing different approaches to evaluating the 
quality of medical care). 
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benefits but not the costs. This might be because the benefits are hard 
to price, but it is more commonly used when the benefits themselves 
are simply uncertain, such as when the agency is unsure how many 
premature deaths the regulation is likely to prevent.24 In such a case, 
an agency employing break-even analysis would calculate the “break-
even point”: the quantity of benefits that the regulation must produce 
in order for costs to equal benefits.25 Thus, for instance, imagine that a 
regulation is expected to cost $100 million, and the agency values each 
life saved at $10 million. The break-even point for this regulation is ten 
lives. 
The problem with break-even analysis is that it does not actually 
tell the agency whether or not to regulate (much less how stringently 
to regulate).26 In the example above, what good does it do the agency 
to know that the break-even point is ten lives if the agency does not 
know how many lives the regulation will save? In order to actually 
make decisions, the agency must formulate some estimate of the likely 
benefits or have some intuitive sense of whether benefits will exceed 
costs. Break-even analysis thus often reduces to a kind of incomplete 
cost-benefit analysis. 
Intuitive, or ad hoc, balancing. This approach involves a broad and 
comprehensive look at all the possible effects of regulation, akin to 
cost-benefit analysis, but without monetization of the benefits (and 
sometimes the costs as well). In these cases, the agency often insists 
that the benefits cannot be reliably monetized because of the 
uncertainty of the effects of the regulation or the nature of the benefits, 
which can be intangible and abstract, such as the pleasure that people 
derive from knowing that wilderness is preserved even if they do not 
visit it.27 When the agency regulates, it does so on the ground that the 
benefits justify the costs even though a formal cost-benefit analysis 
cannot be performed. 
Intuitive balancing is ubiquitous in daily life as well as in 
government. When employers offer amenities to employees, they often 
rely on a rough intuitive sense and do not bother trying to do a cost-
 
 24. Regulation does not actually “save lives,” in the sense that everyone will die eventually. 
Accordingly, some experts speak of regulation as “prolonging life” or “preventing premature 
death.” We use these various terms interchangeably here. 
 25. Daniel A. Farber, Breaking Bad? The Uneasy Case for Regulatory Breakeven Analysis, 
102 CAL. L. REV. 1469, 1487–89 (2014). 
 26. Masur & Posner, Unquantified Benefits, supra note 18, at 93. 
 27. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Commitments in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
103 VA. L. REV. 1809, 1815–16 (2017). 
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benefit analysis, which may be unreliable. When governments build 
monuments, parks, and other public amenities, they will typically 
calculate the costs but often rely on a rough sense of the public interest 
in these amenities rather than try to monetize the benefits. Thus, 
intuitive balancing should not be dismissed as out of hand. But its 
major defect is that because benefits and costs are not fully monetized, 
the decisionmaker may make an error or be subject to some type of 
bias. It is also difficult for outsiders, including researchers and auditors, 
to evaluate the project. 
Democratic procedures. Finally, agencies always solicit the views 
of regulated entities, as required by law.28 Sometimes agencies go 
farther and try to arrange agreements, votes, and other forms of 
participation among those directly affected by a regulatory program.29 
Within constraints, and subject to the agency’s supervision, a form of 
democracy prevails, in the sense that the ultimate regulation or project 
emerges from debate and presumably reflects the self-interested 
calculations of the affected parties.30 Under the democratic approach, 
the agency avoids the burden of evaluating potential regulations based 
on a notion of the public good, but takes the risk that the democratic 
procedure it chooses ends up excluding some affected people or giving 
improper weight to sophisticated parties who figure out how to game 
the system. 
There are not always distinct lines between these approaches: 
overall, agencies frequently adopt a kind of pluralistic approach, 
defending their regulations by claiming that they are consistent with 
multiple decision procedures. Agencies often estimate valuations and 
report them without performing a complete cost-benefit analysis, or 
estimate some valuations while ignoring others.31 Regulatory impact 
analyses often include a range of overlapping approaches. In many of 
them, agencies seem to engage in intuitive balancing and cost-benefit 
analysis, and also to take into account concerns about feasibility and 
unemployment.32 And, as we will demonstrate, actual agency practice 
 
 28. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (mandating opportunities for interested parties to voice their 
opinions in the rulemaking process). 
 29. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated 
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1256–57 (1997) (describing the process of negotiated 
rulemaking). 
 30. For some examples, see Karen Bradshaw, Democratic Risk Management (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with Duke Law Journal).  
 31. Masur & Posner, Unquantified Benefits, supra note 18, at 112–15. 
 32. Id. at 117–18. 
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often involves a kind of norming, even if the agency is nominally using 
one of these other decision procedures. 
II.  NORMING IN PRACTICE 
A. What Is Norming? 
Norming is yet another approach to regulation. It can take 
different forms, and so, to ground intuitions, we start with a simple 
example. 
Imagine that the EPA must regulate a particular practice in a 
particular industry, for example, ozone emissions from power plants. 
Upon investigation, it learns that the various power plants emit 
different amounts of ozone. There could be a number of reasons for 
this variation. For example, some plants might have been constructed 
more recently with the best new technology, which results in less ozone 
emission just because of the efficiency of that technology. 
Alternatively, some plants might have better technology because they 
are operated more cautiously by managers who worry about legal and 
reputational consequences, or because they are located in states or 
other jurisdictions where local legal standards for pollution are stricter. 
Or plants might not emit much ozone because of the particularities of 
their location, which might allow them to use inputs or adopt 
production processes that generate less ozone than other plants do. We 
can imagine many other reasons; we explore some of them below. For 
now, the basic point is that there will be natural variation in ozone 
emissions across plants. 
The exact shape of that distribution will also depend on the 
circumstances, but our argument does not depend on that shape having 
any specific form. The major point is that all (realistic) distributions 
have tails. At the left tail, firms emit more ozone than other firms; at 
the right tail, they emit less. In the middle of the distribution, the firms 
cluster around average levels of emissions. We also bracket, within 
limits, the nature of the variable in question. The EPA may be 
concerned about the overall level of emission per plant; or the level of 
emission relative to something else, like units of production; or the 
costs that the firms have incurred in reducing emissions. The variable 
will be normatively relevant to whatever EPA’s statutory mandate is—
presumably, to advance the well-being of people who are exposed to 
the pollution, or of people generally (including consumers and 
workers). 
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To understand what norming is, let’s start with how the EPA 
would approach the problem of setting a level of regulatory strictness 
using cost-benefit analysis. In principle, the EPA could require firms 
to reduce ozone emissions to zero (equivalently: to install expensive 
technology or shut down production), or the EPA could impose a de 
minimis regulation (requiring the plants to do nothing at all), or 
anything in between. A cost-benefit analysis tells the EPA to set the 
level that maximizes benefits (usually in terms of human health, 
including reduced mortality risk, lower medical expenses, and so on) 
relative to the costs to the firms. The best regulation based on a cost-
benefit analysis could turn out to require all firms, most firms, a few 
firms, or no firms to reduce emissions. Everything depends on what the 
underlying variables are. 
In the case of norming, the EPA derives from the distribution 
itself the proper level of regulation. We define norming to mean that 
the EPA sets the level of regulatory strictness somewhere between the 
best firm and zero. Every firm that exceeds the standard may continue 
to conduct business as usual. Every firm that falls below the standard 
must bring its production into compliance with the standard. 
 
Figure 1: Examples of Norming 
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Figure 1 illustrates the simple point we are trying to make. 
Imagine that the horizontal axis represents a variable of interest to the 
regulator—such as how effective a factory is at eliminating pollution, 
with dirtier factories at the left end of the distribution and cleaner 
factories at the right end of the distribution. The vertical axis 
represents the number of factories at any given level of pollution. 
While the examples in Figure 1 all show a normal curve, the 
distribution could have any shape. The vertical line shows the “norm” 
chosen by the regulator. The factories that fall to the left of the vertical 
line are out of regulatory compliance. If the regulation is enforced, 
those factories will be either shut down or brought into compliance. As 
a result, the  part of the post-regulation distribution represented by the 
shaded area will be truncated. 
An agency that engages in norming, as we define it, could set the 
standard at any location along the distribution. A weak standard would 
be located at the left side of the distribution; nearly all firms would be 
in compliance. A strict standard would be located at the right side of 
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the distribution; nearly all firms would be out of compliance. Norming 
targets the tail of a distribution, but there is nothing inherent to the 
concept of norming that defines how much of that tail—whether just 
the worst-behaving firms, or a much broader swath of firms—will be 
forced to change behavior. The distinctive feature of norming is that 
the regulatory standard is internal to existing practices of the industry 
rather than derived from exogenous factors like cost, benefit, and risk. 
It is based on the distribution of existing firm practices, not an external 
normative framework. 
Another question raised by norming is the nature of the variable 
of interest to the regulator. In our example, we suggested that an 
agency might be concerned about the amount of pollution emitted per 
factory. However, an agency might care more about the amount of 
pollution per unit of production, or per unit of social benefit, or the 
social harm per unit of production, or some other measure. As we will 
see below, agencies norm on the basis of a range of different variables. 
In some cases, agencies explicitly acknowledge that they are 
engaging in norming, and sometimes the governing statutes even 
require it. This is particularly true in the context of environmental law. 
In other cases, another type of decision procedure, such as feasibility 
analysis, reduces to norming as it is practiced by agencies. Finally, in a 
third category of cases, agencies engage in norming as a shortcut, 
anticipating that it will lead to good, though not ideal, regulation. 
In the sections that follow, we survey some of the most important 
regulatory agencies, spanning a wide variety of areas of law. We 
demonstrate the ways in which those agencies rely upon norming in 
their regulatory decision-making. 
B. Environmental Law 
The EPA relies substantially upon norming. In some cases, a 
statute explicitly directs the agency to engage in norming; in other 
cases, the agency has interpreted its governing statutes to require 
norming, even when other options might be available. Here, we focus 
on two EPA case studies, one based upon the Clean Water Act, and 
one based upon the Clean Air Act. We then briefly survey other 
sections of the environmental laws and describe the ways in which they 
require the EPA to engage in norming as well. 
1. Clean Water Act.  The Clean Water Act requires the EPA to 
regulate the discharge of conventional pollutants from existing point 
sources by mandating the “best practicable control technology 
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currently available.”33 The statute further directs the EPA to 
determine the best practicable control technology by considering: 
the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent 
reduction benefits to be achieved from such application, . . . the age 
of equipment and facilities involved, the process employed, the 
engineering aspects of the application of various types of control 
techniques, process changes, non-water quality environmental impact 
. . . and such other factors as the Administrator deems appropriate . . 
. .34 
In applying this language, the EPA has employed a regulatory 
methodology that it terms “average of the best.” The EPA identifies 
the “best-performing” polluters within the category of polluters being 
regulated—those who emit the least pollution—and requires all the 
polluters to perform as well as the average of the best-performing 
polluters—hence, “average of the best.” The “average of the best” 
standard appears to have originated in congressional debates over the 
Clean Water Act in 1972.35 The standard was initially proposed by 
Senator Edmund Muskie, the sponsor and principal drafter of the 
Clean Water Act, during Senate floor debates over the Clean Water 
Act.36 
One example of this methodology comes from the EPA’s 1987 
regulation of producers of organic compounds, plastics, and synthetic 
fibers.37 Manufacturers of these products emit a wide variety of 
hazardous pollutants.38 In the course of its regulation, the EPA first 
identified 304 sources of pollution—factories or plants—that would be 
subject to regulation.39 Of these 304 sources, it then selected the ninety-
nine sources that were employing the “best” technology to control 
 
 33. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 34. See id. § 1314(b)(1)(B). 
 35. Thomas B. Arnold, Effluent Limitations and NPDES: Federal and State Implementation 
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 15 B.C. L. REV. 767, 767–83 
(1974). 
 36. 118 CONG. REC. 33696 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (“The 
Administrator should establish the range of ‘best practicable’ levels based upon the average of 
the best existing performance by plants of various sizes, ages, and unit processes within each 
industrial category.”). 
 37. Organic Chemicals and Plastics and Synthetic Fibers Category Effluent Limitations 
Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards, 52 Fed. Reg. 
42,522 (Nov. 5, 1987). 
 38. Id. at 42,526–27. 
 39. Chem. Mfr. Ass’n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 208–09 (5th Cir. 1989). 
MASUR  POSNER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2019  1:11 PM 
1398  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1383 
emissions.40 Of those ninety-nine sources, the EPA then selected the 
seventy-one that had achieved the greatest pollution reduction—the 
plants whose emissions were no more than forty milligrams of pollutant 
material per liter of water discharged into the public waterways.41 The 
EPA set the regulatory standard equal to the average level of existing 
pollution control at these seventy-one plants.42 
At first glance, it might appear as though the EPA has normed to 
a fairly stringent degree. In setting the regulatory standard equal to the 
average of the best seventy-one plants, the agency pegged its regulation 
to (approximately) the thirty-sixth-best-performing source, out of 304 
sources subject to the regulation—roughly the 88th percentile of all 
existing sources. However, the agency makes clear that the regulation 
would not be nearly so onerous as that description might sound. 
According to the agency, the appropriate technology was already “in 
place at 156 of 304 direct discharging plants” to be regulated.43 
Accordingly, of the 304 regulated emitters of pollution, roughly thirty-
six would already be in compliance with the regulation, and another 
120 would have the necessary pollution control equipment in place and 
need only to operate it properly. Only 148 of 304 plants—49 percent—
were required to construct or install new equipment, at a total cost of 
$215.8 million.44 Thus, the norm was set close to the median, as in the 
first example in Figure 1. 
This regulation dealt with “conventional” pollutants, which are 
governed under the Clean Water Act by the “best practicable 
technology” standard. Other sections of the Clean Water Act variously 
direct the EPA to mandate the “best technology available for 
minimizing adverse environmental impact,”45 the “best conventional 
pollutant control technology,”46 the “best available technology 
economically achievable,”47 and the “best available demonstrated 
 
 40. Id. at 208; Organic Chemicals and Plastics and Synthetic Fibers Category Effluent 
Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards, 52 
Fed. Reg. at 42,534–35. The agency concluded that the best technology was “biologic treatment,” 
followed by “secondary clarification as necessary to assure adequate treatment of solids.” Id. 
 41. Id. at 42,534–35. 
 42. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n, 870 F.2d at 208. 
 43. Organic Chemicals and Plastics and Synthetic Fibers Category Effluent Limitations 
Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards, 52 Fed. Reg. at 
42,536–37. 
 44. Id. at 42,537. 
 45. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2012). 
 46. Id. § 1311(b)(2)(E). 
 47. Id. § 1311(b)(2)(A)(i).  
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control technology.”48 Each of these standards involves some type of 
norming, typically selected by the EPA with regard to the legislative 
history of the Clean Water Act. For instance, the “best available 
technology economically achievable” applies to the EPA’s regulation 
of “toxic” pollutants,49 such as cyanide,50 which are especially harmful 
to human health and can be fatal in small doses. Here, too, the language 
is ambiguous and could permit the application of a variety of potential 
standards. And here, too, the EPA has adopted a particular rule based 
upon its reading of the legislative history. When regulating under the 
“best available technology” standard, the EPA pegs its regulation to 
the single best-performing plant—the source with the lowest level of 
pollution emitted.51 
This is, of course, the most stringent possible version of norming—
norming to the furthest right-tail outlier. However, while this is the 
most stringent statutory standard contained within the Clean Water 
Act,52 even this standard directs the agency to regulate based upon 
technology that already exists and is in use within the industry. The 
agency does not mandate the development or installation of new 
technology that no firm yet employs. 
2. Clean Air Act.  Unlike the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act 
includes a statutory standard that explicitly demands norming. Section 
112 of the Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA to regulate sources of 
“hazardous” pollutants, which are particularly dangerous airborne 
chemicals that Congress and the agency have selected and listed.53 The 
statute requires that the EPA regulate so as to produce “the maximum 
degree of reduction in emissions of the hazardous air pollutants.”54 The 
 
 48. Id. § 1316(a)(1). 
 49. Id. § 1311(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 50. 40 C.F.R. §§ 414.91, .101 (2018). 
 51. See Kennecott v. EPA, 780 F.2d 445, 448 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, 
93D CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT 
AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 170, 789 (Comm. Print 1973)). The production of organic chemicals, 
plastics, and synthetic fibers also involves the release of these types of chemicals, and so the EPA 
set limits on those types of pollutants in the same regulation as well. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 
870 F.2d 177, 226–27 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Organic Chemicals and Plastics and Synthetic Fibers 
Guidelines, Fed. Reg. 42,522, 42,538–40 (Nov. 5, 1987) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 414 and 416)). 
David Driesen describes this approach as “follow-the-leader.” Driesen, Distributing the Costs of 
Environmental, Health, and Safety Protection, supra note 19, at 44–46. 
 52. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 244 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b). 
 54. Id. § 7412(d)(2); see also id. § 7412(g)(2)(A) (“After the effective date of a permit 
program . . . no person may modify a major source of hazardous air pollutants . . . unless the 
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statute then defines “maximum degree of reduction” differently for 
new pollution sources—those that are constructed after regulation is 
already in place—and existing sources, those that predate regulation. 
For new sources, the statute provides that the EPA must prescribe 
emissions standards that are at least as stringent as “the emission 
control that is achieved in practice by the best controlled similar 
source.”55 This is equivalent to the Clean Water Act’s “best available 
control technology” standard, though here it is written into the statute 
rather than having been created by the agency. For existing sources of 
pollution, the statute directs the EPA to promulgate standards that are 
at least as stringent as “the average emission limitation achieved by the 
best performing 12 percent of the existing sources.”56 This is the Clean 
Air Act’s version of “average of the best,” here again written directly 
into the statute.57 
Notably, the statute does not require that the agency regulate only 
to the standard set by the average of the best-performing 12 percent. 
This is only a floor; the agency may regulate more stringently if it 
wishes.58 In practice, however, the EPA regularly sets its regulatory 
standards equal to the average of the best 12 percent. For instance, in 
2004, the EPA issued a regulation limiting hazardous air pollutant 
emissions from boilers and process heaters.59 These types of heaters 
 
Administrator . . . determines that the maximum achievable control technology emission 
limitation under this section for existing sources will be met.” (emphasis added)). This is 
sometimes referred to as requiring the “maximum achievable control technology” (MACT). The 
two formulations are equivalent. 
 55. Id. § 7412(d)(3). 
 56. Id. § 7412(d)(3)(A). 
 57. Section 112 of the Clean Air Act in its current form was passed as part of the Clean Air 
Act Amendments of 1990. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 301, 
104 Stat. 2399, 2531–74 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7412). By the time this section 
was enacted into law, the EPA had been using the “average of the best” standard (and the “best-
performing” standard) for decades. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. This provided 
Congress with a model for how to draft the new statute. 
 58. The statute states that emission standards promulgated under this subsection: 
 [S]hall not be less stringent, and may be more stringent than—  
(A) the average emission limitation achieved by the best performing 12 percent of the  
existing sources . . . or 
(B) the average emission limitation achieved by the best performing 5 sources . . . in the  
category or subcategory for categories or subcategories with fewer than 30 sources. 
42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3). 
 59. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Industrial, 
Commercial, and Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 69 Fed. Reg. 55,218, 52,218 (Sept. 13, 
2004) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). A process heater is a type of heater used to heat liquids, and 
it is often used for food or chemical processing, hence the name. 
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emit a range of hazardous chemicals, including arsenic and chromium.60 
First, the EPA divided the boilers into eighteen categories and 
classified the hazardous air pollutants into four types, for a total of 
seventy-two boiler-pollutant subcategories to be regulated.61 In 
accordance with the statute, the EPA then determined the “average of 
the best” polluters for these seventy-two subcategories. For twenty-five 
of them, the agency set emissions standards.62 For the other forty-
seven, the agency refused to impose any sort of emissions limitation 
whatsoever, because “the best-performing sources were not achieving 
emissions reductions through the use of an emission control system.”63 
That is, even the “best-performing” sources were doing nothing to 
reduce their emissions.64 
The EPA then announced that it would not impose more stringent 
regulation than that dictated by the “average of the best.” The agency 
explained: 
As documented in the memorandum “Methodology for Estimating 
Costs and Emissions Impacts for Industrial, Commercial, and 
Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters National Emission 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants” in the docket, EPA did 
consider the cost and emission impacts of a variety of regulatory 
options more stringent than the MACT floor for each subcategory. 
The EPA recognizes that for some subcategories, more stringent 
controls than the MACT floor can be applied and achieve additional 
emissions reductions. However, EPA also determined that the cost 
impacts of such controls were very high. Considering both the costs 
and emissions reductions, EPA determined that it would be infeasible 
to require any options more stringent than the floor level.65 
The document referenced in the EPA’s explanation does indeed 
include cost estimates for two more stringent regulatory options.66 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. at 55,222–24; Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1250, 1254–55 (D.C. Cir. 
2007). 
 62. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 489 F.3d at 1254–55. 
 63. National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Industrial, Commercial, 
and Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 69 Fed. Reg. at 55,233. 
 64. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 489 F.3d at 1254–55. 
 65. National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Industrial, Commercial, 
and Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 69 Fed. Reg at 55,237. 
 66. See Memorandum from Roy Oommen, Eastern Research Group, to Jim Eddinger, U.S. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, Methodology for Estimating Cost and Emissions Impacts for Industrial, 
Commercial, and Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants 9–14 (Oct. 2002) (providing cost estimates for two more stringent 
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However, it does not include any comparison between the costs of 
these regulatory options and the benefits they would be expected to 
produce.67 For that, one must turn to the EPA’s own Regulatory 
Impact Analysis (“RIA”). The RIA includes calculations of the costs 
and benefits of the regulation the EPA eventually chose, plus one of 
the more stringent alternatives described in the “Methodology” 
document.68 Under both the rule the agency selected and the one 
alternative it analyzed, the net benefits of the regulation are 
significant—on the order of $15 billion, depending on the discount rate 
chosen.69 At the same time, the EPA concluded that the more stringent 
regulation would produce slightly lower net benefits than the laxer 
regulation it selected.70 
It is thus possible that the EPA was justified in regulating only to 
the level of the “average of the best,” which meant leaving forty-five 
heater/pollutant subcategories unregulated. However, the agency did 
not analyze the other more stringent regulatory option described in the 
“Methodology” document, much less a comprehensive set of 
alternatives.71 By confining itself to an examination of existing 
practices, rather than engaging in a full-fledged cost-benefit analysis, 
the agency committed itself to norming. 
Many other parts of the Clean Air Act similarly speak in the 
language of norming, even though they do not require it so explicitly 
as section 112 does. Above, we cited a section of the Clean Air Act that 
calls for the agency to regulate to the extent “appropriate and 
necessary.” As we noted, this ambiguous language does not offer the 
agency much guidance and does not appear to contemplate norming. 
But other parts of the law are clearer. One section instructs the EPA 
to mandate the “best system of emission reduction . . . adequately 
 
regulatory options in Tables 3-2 and 3-3). 
 67. Id. 
 68. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE INDUSTRIAL 
BOILERS AND PROCESS HEATERS NESHAP 10-2 tbl.10-1 (2004), https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/
regdata/RIAs/indboilprocheatfinalruleRIA.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V49-RYHY]. 
 69. Id. at 10-51. When costs or benefits will arise in the future, they must be “discounted” to 
present value to reflect the fact that having a dollar today is more valuable than having the same 
dollar in a year or ten years. See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. 
Masur, Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603, 1684 (2013) (describing 
discounting). 
 70. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 68, at 10-51. The agency found that net benefits 
would drop by $160 million, or approximately 1 percent of the total, if it adopted the more 
stringent regulation. Id. 
 71. See id. at 10-2.  
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demonstrated.”72 Another requires the “best available control 
technology,”73 much like the Clean Water Act. And a third mandates 
“reasonably available control technology.”74 
All of these statutory formulations within the Clean Water Act 
and Clean Air Act direct the EPA to norm. They instruct the EPA to 
select a level of regulation based upon “available” or “achievable” 
technology, presumably already in use by some regulated parties, and 
mandate that technology across the board. While different statutory 
sections of the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act call for regulation 
at varying levels of stringency, they simply represent different levels of 
norming. For instance, the EPA norms differently when it regulates 
under the “best available technology” standard in the Clean Water Act 
than when it regulates under the “best practicable technology” 
standard.75 While the location of the “norm” may be different, the 
underlying norming methodology is the same. 
C. Workplace Safety 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act authorizes the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) to 
promulgate regulations regarding workplace safety. OSHA must 
impose the regulation “which most adequately assures, to the extent 
feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee 
will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity.”76 This 
statutory language gave rise to so-called “feasibility analysis,” which 
we criticized in an earlier article.77 Under feasibility analysis, the 
agency imposes the strictest possible regulation that will not lead to 
mass layoffs or bankrupt significant numbers of firms within the 
regulated industry.78 
Feasibility analysis involves a kind of norming. In broad strokes, 
the feasibility approach directs OSHA to avoid imposing substantial 
regulatory costs on an industry. One obvious means of accomplishing 
this is to set regulatory standards that many firms within the industry 
 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012). 
 73. Id. § 7475(a)(4). 
 74. Id. § 7502(c)(1). 
 75. See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 220–21 (2009). 
 76. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2012). 
 77. See generally Masur & Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, supra note 10 (critiquing 
feasibility analysis). 
 78. Id. at 657. 
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already meet, thus imposing no additional costs on those firms. Indeed, 
this is precisely how OSHA often regulates. We offer three examples. 
The first comes from a major OSHA rule on workplace air 
contaminants.79 In this regulation, OSHA identified hundreds of 
hazardous chemicals to which employees are exposed in the 
workplace.80 In preparation for the regulation, OSHA surveyed over 
1.1 million workplaces.81 It found that over 500,000 workplaces used 
one of the chemicals being regulated.82 But of those 500,000 
workplaces, only 131,005, or roughly 26 percent, “would incur some 
costs to comply with the new limits.”83 That is, nearly 75 percent of all 
workplaces that used one of the chemicals at issue were already in 
compliance with the regulation. 
OSHA’s relatively weak regulations were the result of a deliberate 
choice. In setting these standards, OSHA did not engage in “true” 
feasibility analysis, in the sense of determining how stringently it could 
regulate without causing mass layoffs or significant bankruptcies. 
Instead, it relied on standards that had been proposed by the American 
Conference of Governmental and Industrial Hygienists (“ACGIH”).84 
ACGIH standards are well known in the field for being relatively lax, 
in part because the ACGIH largely relies upon industry surveys and 
data when setting them.85 In fact, there was evidence that the ACGIH 
 
 79. Air Contaminants, 54 Fed. Reg. 2332 (Jan. 19, 1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910).  
 80. Id. at 2724–25. 
 81. Id. at 2728 tbl.B-2. 
 82. Id. at 2726. 
 83. Id. at 2727, 2728 tbl.B-2. 
 84. See id. at 2724–25 (“Four hundred of these exposure limits were based on the 
recommendations of the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists 
(ACGIH) . . . .”); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale 
for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729, 737 (“In [OSHA’s new air contaminants 
standard], OSHA adopted less stringent standards for air contaminants by relying almost 
exclusively on threshold limit values (TLVs) established by the American Conference of 
Governmental and Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) . . . .”). 
 85. See, e.g., Barry I. Castleman & Grace E. Ziem, Corporate Influence On Threshold Limit 
Values, 13 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 531, 537 (1988) (finding that many of the ACGIH standards were 
promulgated with reference to “unpublished corporate studies”); James C. Robinson, Dalton G. 
Paxman & Stephen M. Rappaport, Implications of OSHA’s Reliance on TLVs in Developing the 
Air Contaminants Standard, 19 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 3, 10 (1991) (criticizing the ACGIH standards 
for excessive reliance on industry reporting and inconsistency with the scientific literature); 
Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 84, at 738 (“[T]he ACGIH ignores published scientific material 
and relies more heavily on industry-supplied data . . . .”). In fact, OSHA’s regulation was even 
laxer than the ACGIH guidelines would have dictated: “OSHA failed to designate 67 substances 
covered by the rulemaking as carcinogens, and excluded an additional 68 substances from the 
ruling altogether, despite the cancer designations from NIOSH, ACGIH, NTP, EPA, and IARC.” 
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was itself engaged in norming, and that it had arrived at these standards 
precisely because they were already in widespread use throughout the 
industry. As a former chairman of the ACGIH committee charged with 
devising the standards explained, some standards “have been based on 
a decade or two of industrial experience . . . . Clearly, such procedures 
can yield indisputable data on which realistic [standards] can be 
derived . . . .”86 Another former chairman of the same committee even 
alleged directly that the committee had been overly influenced by the 
regulated industry and charged industry consultants with engaging in 
“chicanery.”87 In the words of one pair of commentators, “[o]ur 
conclusion is that [the ACGIH standards] for chemical substances are 
a compromise between health-based considerations and strictly 
practical industrial considerations, with the balance seeming to 
strongly favor the latter.”88 It is little wonder that so few firms were 
required to expend resources to comply with the new OSHA standards. 
OSHA never explicitly stated that it was engaged in norming. It is 
possible that it was unaware of the ACGIH’s reliance on norming, that 
it arrived at these standards after some other type of analysis, and that 
the resemblance to norming is mere coincidence. Yet it seems 
reasonable to infer that the agency chose this standard precisely 
because it had already been so widely adopted. OSHA was surely 
aware that the ACGIH standards had already been widely adopted, 
and it must have known of ACGIH’s reputation for adopting standards 
congenial to industry. The standard is also lax—too lax, according to 
most experts.89 The only thing to recommend the ACGIH standards is 
the fact that they had already been widely adopted. It looks very much 
as if OSHA was just norming to the 25th percentile.  
Our second example is a 1991 OSHA rule regulating risks related 
to bloodborne pathogens such as hepatitis B and HIV.90 The purpose 
of the regulation was to mandate consistent and reliable safety 
practices for workplaces, such as dentists’ or doctors’ offices, where 
 
Dalton G. Paxman & James C. Robinson, Regulation of Occupational Carcinogens Under 
OSHA’s Air Contaminants Standard, 12 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 296, 302 (1990). 
This critique of OSHA’s Airborne Contaminants rule is trenchantly made by Shapiro and 
McGarity as well. See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 84 at 736–38. 
 86. S.A. Roach & S.M. Rappaport, But They Are Not Thresholds: A Critical Analysis of the 
Documentation of Threshold Limit Values, 17 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 727, 741 (1990). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 90. Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,004 (Dec. 6, 1991) 
(codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910.1030). 
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workers might come into contact with blood.91 OSHA, however, did 
not create the safety standards out of whole cloth. Rather, the 
regulation mirrored a set of guidelines that the Centers for Disease 
Control (“CDC”) had released years earlier.92 By the time OSHA got 
around to promulgating the regulation, most businesses had already 
implemented their own safety rules based upon the CDC’s guidelines 
and were already in compliance with the rule or close to it. Here is how 
OSHA described the status quo ante: 
Since the requirements of the standard closely follow the guidelines 
issued by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) on universal 
precautions (UP), efforts by many organizations to adhere to the 
guidelines have created a solid base of practices and technology for 
the supplemental implementation of the standard. Based on recent 
surveys conducted by the Agency and other information available in 
the rulemaking docket, OSHA produced quantitative estimates of the 
compliance baseline, or extent of current compliance. OSHA found 
that most establishments have already implemented measures to 
protect workers from occupational exposure to blood and other 
potentially infectious materials, and that many are very close to full 
compliance with this standard.93 
Sure enough, after surveying the regulated population, OSHA found 
that pre-regulatory rates of compliance ranged as high as 85 to 90 
percent for certain industries and certain requirements.94 
It may seem odd or indefensible to criticize an agency for adopting 
CDC guidelines in its regulation. After all, the CDC is presumably 
expert in this area, and it may well have selected the optimal level of 
precautions when formulating its guidelines. However, here that 
turned out not to be the case. OSHA’s regulations proved to be 
inadequate, particularly with respect to injuries from handling dirty 
needles. In response, nine years later, Congress passed a new law, the 
Needlestick Safety and Prevention Act, mandating a new round of 
bloodborne pathogen regulation.95 OSHA promulgated new standards, 
and those remain in effect today.96 
 
 91. See id. at 64,006–08. 
 92. Am. Dental Ass’n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 824, 836 (7th Cir. 1993).  
 93. Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,039. 
 94. Id. at 64,060–63.  
 95. Needlestick Safety and Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 106-430, 114 Stat. 1901 (2000). 
 96. Quick Reference Guide to the Bloodborne Pathogens Standard, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/
bloodbornepathogens/bloodborne_quickref.html [https://perma.cc/PY7J-3FEN]. 
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As with OSHA’s air contaminant regulation, the agency never 
states directly that it is engaged in norming.97 But we can infer that 
OSHA likely adopted these standards because they were already in 
such widespread use. OSHA’s industry survey predated its regulatory 
decision. When it promulgated the regulation, it was aware that a high 
percentage of firms were already in compliance. It is also unlikely that 
OSHA arrived at these standards through any other type of decision 
procedure. The standards are substantially weaker than what either 
cost-benefit analysis or feasibility analysis would have dictated.98 
Indeed, they were viewed as so insufficient that Congress passed new 
legislation to mandate stricter standards less than a decade later. 
Accordingly, even without any explicit indication, it is likely that 
OSHA’s bloodborne pathogen regulations were the result of norming. 
Our final example is a 2016 regulation of crystalline silica, which 
can cause lung cancer and a variety of other serious illnesses if 
inhaled.99 Here, too, OSHA’s regulation grew out of widespread 
agreement on the part of both regulated industry and labor groups that 
regulation was called for: 
Both industry and worker groups have recognized that a 
comprehensive standard is needed to protect workers exposed to 
respirable crystalline silica. For example, ASTM International 
(originally known as the American Society for Testing and Materials) 
has published voluntary consensus standards for addressing the 
hazards of crystalline silica, and the Building and Construction Trades 
Department, AFL-CIO also has recommended a comprehensive 
program standard. These recommended standards include provisions 
for methods of compliance, exposure monitoring, training, and 
medical surveillance. The National Industrial Sand Association has 
also developed an occupational exposure program for crystalline 
silica that addresses exposure assessment and medical surveillance.100 
 
 
 97. Neither does the CDC, which did not have the same reputation as the ACGIH for 
adopting standards dictated by industry. 
 98. Recall that under feasibility analysis, OSHA is expected to regulate to the greatest extent 
possible without causing mass layoffs or widespread firm bankruptcies. Masur & Posner, Against 
Feasibility Analysis, supra note 10, at 662–63. Here, fewer than half of the affected firms needed 
to take any action at all, much less lay off even a single employee. Occupational Exposure to 
Bloodborne Pathogens, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,060. 
 99. Occupational Exposure to Respirable Crystalline Silica, 81 Fed. Reg. 16,286, 16,287 
(Mar. 25, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1926). 
 100. Id. at 16,297. 
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Not surprisingly, OSHA eventually settled on a regulation with which 
most industries were already in compliance. Based upon a series of 
samples of existing firms, the agency found that 74 percent of general 
industrial firms101 and 51 percent of construction firms already had 
ambient silica levels below the new regulatory standards.102 
Here, too, we have no direct evidence that OSHA was engaging 
in norming, rather than feasibility analysis. But OSHA’s economic 
analysis of its regulation is suggestive, because it seems to belie the 
agency’s claim that it was engaged in feasibility analysis. In its 
explanation of the regulation, OSHA argued that it had chosen to limit 
workplace silica emissions to “the lowest level feasible for all affected 
industries.”103 In this context, OSHA defines feasibility to mean that 
compliance costs will be no more than 10 percent of firm profits or 1 
percent of firm revenues.104 However, the agency found that 
compliance costs would equal, on average, only 2.43 percent of profits 
and 0.06 percent of revenues for maritime and general industrial 
firms.105 For construction firms, the average costs would be even 
smaller: 1.52 percent of profits and 0.05 percent of revenues.106 If 
OSHA were serious about regulating up to the limit of what would be 
economically feasible, one wonders why the agency did not select a 
more stringent level of regulation that would impose greater costs on 
industry.107 This raises the implication that OSHA chose the level of 
regulatory stringency on the basis of something other than feasibility 
analysis, such as norming. 
 
 101. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FINAL ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS AND FINAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS, SUPPORTING DOCUMENT FOR 
THE FINAL RULE FOR OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO RESPIRABLE CRYSTALLINE SILICA IV-29, 
tbl.IV.2-B (2016). 
 102. Id. at IV-30, tbl.IV.2-C. 
 103. Occupational Exposure to Respirable Crystalline Silica, 81 Fed. Reg. at 16,287. 
 104. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 101, at VI-97. 
 105. Id. at VI-14. 
 106. Id. at VI-97. 
 107. OSHA might justify its regulation on the grounds that, despite the low average costs, 
there were eight discrete industries in which compliance costs would exceed 10 percent of profits. 
Id. at VI-14. The agency defended its choice of regulation on the ground that firms in these 
industries were unlikely to see their actual profits decline by 10 percent. In all probability, they 
would be able to pass a substantial portion of their compliance costs along to consumers in the 
form of higher prices without losing significant market share. See id. at VI-22. Whether this is 
correct or not, the agency cannot have it both ways. Either these firms would suffer profit losses 
in excess of 10 percent, in which case the regulation was too stringent and too costly by OSHA’s 
own standard. Or they would not, in which case the regulation—which imposed average 
compliance costs well below OSHA’s standard—was too lax and should have been strengthened. 
In either event, this was not the outcome that feasibility analysis would have dictated. 
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D. Financial Regulation 
Banks are heavily regulated because they impose risks on the 
economy. The harmful externalities arise from two sources. First, 
because banks play a central role in the financial system, and because 
banks are linked together through financial transactions, the collapse 
of one bank can cause the collapse of the entire financial system, 
resulting in a sudden withdrawal of credit from the economy. Because 
businesses depend on credit, bank collapse can in turn cause business 
collapse. Second, because the government supplies insurance to the 
banking system—to minimize the risk of a financial crisis—banks 
externalize some of the risks they take on the government and hence 
the taxpayer. To deter excessive risky financial activities, the 
government regulates banks. 
Much of the risk caused by the banking system comes from banks’ 
reliance on demand deposits for the bulk of their capital needs. As a 
result, banks are highly leveraged. High leverage leads to high returns 
for shareholders, but also high risk, which is externalized on taxpayers. 
To counter this risk, regulators impose capital requirements. These 
regulations require banks to raise a certain portion of their capital from 
equity. The capital requirement designates that portion—which has 
varied from about 5 to 8 percent over the years.108 For a simple 
example, if a bank owns assets worth $100, and the capital requirement 
is 5 percent, then it can be funded with no more than $95 of debt. The 
other $5 must take the form of equity. 
Banks, like other businesses, do not necessarily maximize their 
profits by relying as much as possible on debt. There are business 
reasons—related to tax, corporate governance, and other 
considerations—that cause business to choose varying mixes of debt 
and equity. Many banks maintain relatively high capital ratios.109 
However, the risk externality and government insurance cause banks 
at the margin to substitute debt for equity.110 
Congress has required regulators to set capital requirements, but 
provided little guidance as to their levels.111 Regulators thus have had 
considerable discretion in choosing the stringency of capital 
 
 108. See Eric A. Posner, How Do Bank Regulators Determine Capital-Adequacy 
Requirements?, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1853, 1866–71 (2015) (discussing the evolution of capital 
requirement regulations in the U.S. from the 1970s to 2013). 
 109. Id. at 1875 n.102.  
 110. Id. at 1859–60, 1862–64.  
 111. See id. at 1874. 
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requirements. In earlier work, one of us shows that rather than 
determine capital requirements using cost-benefit analysis, regulators 
have engaged in norming.112 They have chosen capital requirements 
that were typically below the capital ratios that prevailed in the vast 
majority of banks. The effect was to burden only the least capitalized 
banks, the outliers on the distribution of capital ratios. Notably, the 
financial agencies justified the capital requirements they chose based 
on just this point—that the requirements would burden only a small 
number of banks. 
One of many examples comes from the mid-1980s. In 1983, 
Congress passed the International Lending Supervision Act, which 
required the bank regulators to “achieve and maintain adequate capital 
by establishing minimum levels of capital” for the banking system.113 
The language provides no guidance whatsoever. But because the 
statute was passed in response to an earlier banking crisis, the agencies 
understood that they were supposed to raise capital levels. In 1985 the 
bank regulators raised capital requirements to 5.5 percent for primary 
capital and 6 percent for total capital.114 
None of the three major regulators explained why they set capital 
requirements at these new levels. What they did say was that that the 
new levels would affect relatively few banks. The Comptroller of the 
Currency, which regulates national banks, said: 
[A]pproximately 95% of all national banks had a primary capital ratio 
in excess of 6%, a level which would exceed the primary capital 
requirement established by this regulation. In addition, most of the 
larger multinational and regional banks (which generally have lower 
capital ratios than smaller banks) had primary and total capital ratios 
which would exceed the minimum requirements.115 
In other words, the regulation would affect only a small percentage of 
banks—5 percent of them. This is a classic example of norming. 
There is good reason to believe that the regulations were far from 
adequate. Most economists believe that capital requirements should be 
much higher.116 Decades later, after the financial crisis, regulators 
 
 112. Id. at 1882–93. 
 113. International Lending Supervision Act, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 908(a)(1), 97 Stat. 1153, 
1280 (1983) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3907(a)(1) (2012)). 
 114. Minimum Capital Ratios; Issuance of Directives, 50 Fed. Reg. 10,207, 10,208 (Mar. 14, 
1985) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 7). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See, e.g., ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S 
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finally jacked up capital regulations to a respectable level.117 Norming 
may have been tempting in earlier years because it allowed bank 
regulators to impose restrictions on the worse banks without stirring 
resistance from the entire industry. But with the benefit of hindsight, 
we can see that this approach was a serious mistake. 
E. Automobile Safety 
The regulation of automobile safety by the Department of 
Transportation (“DOT”) has been, from its inception, an exercise in 
norming. In 1966, Congress passed the National Traffic and Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act, which delegated authority to the DOT to 
promulgate safety regulations.118 The law directed the relevant agency 
officials to “establish by order appropriate Federal motor vehicle 
safety standards. Each such Federal motor vehicle safety standard shall 
be practicable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall 
be stated in objective terms.”119 The law then specified that the DOT 
should immediately engage in at least two rounds of regulation. For the 
first round of regulation, the law required the DOT to “issue initial 
Federal motor vehicle safety standards based upon existing safety 
standards.”120 That is, Congress explicitly instructed the agency to set 
its initial regulatory standards according to what firms in the industry 
were already doing. For the second round, the law merely directed the 
agency to issue “new and revised” safety standards.121 The Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act thus resembles section 112 of the Clean Air Act, in 
that norming is explicitly written into the language of the statute. 
 
WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 104 (2013); David Miles, Jing Yang & 
Gilberto Marcheggiano, Optimal Bank Capital, 123 ECON. J. no. 567, Mar. 2013, at 1, 2; John 
Cassidy, Interview With Eugene Fama, NEW YORKER (Jan. 13, 2010), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/interview-with-eugene-fama [https://perma.cc/ 
9XRT-EC9V] (recommending a higher equity capital requirements); John H. Cochrane, The 
More Bank Capital, the Safer the Bank, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2011), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304911104576444482440753132 [http://perma.cc/ 
2EUK-KEG7]; Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Enrica Detragiache & Ouarda Merrouche, Bank Capital: 
Lessons From the Financial Crisis 13 (World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Fin. & Private Sector 
Dev. Team Policy Research Working Paper No. 5473, Nov. 2010), 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/3955/WPS5473.pdf?sequence=1 
[https://perma.cc/MR86-TZFK]. 
 117. See IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 59–61 (2018). 
 118. See National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 
(1966). 
 119. Id. § 103(a), 80 Stat. at 719. 
 120. Id. § 103(h), 80 Stat. at 720. 
 121. Id. 
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In 1970, the National Commission on Product Safety 
commissioned an outside report by a group of lawyers and law 
professors to evaluate the DOT’s progress in regulating auto safety.122 
The report found that twenty-nine of the agency’s first thirty-four 
regulations had minimal effect on how automobiles were designed and 
built.123 The report concluded: 
[T]he best that may be said for the safety standards issued thus far is 
that they incorporate some of the best of current practice in the 
automobile industry. 
Almost every performance requirement was derived from industry 
development and practice. Industry has led and Government has 
followed. The agency has chosen from among industry’s best practices 
those suitable for issuance as performance requirements. If this 
pattern continues, progress in the issuance of safety standards could 
move no faster than industry’s progress in developing and putting into 
practice particular safety advances.124 
This remained the case even after the agency was no longer required 
to promulgate regulations “based upon existing safety standards.”125 
As one study put it, “As a practical matter, however, the ‘existing 
standards’ requirement of the statute far outlived the initial rules. The 
point is well illustrated by the second generation of safety standards . . 
. . These thirteen rules were no more innovative than the first 
generation had been.”126 
Decades later, the DOT—and its subunit, the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”)—now regulates under new 
authority from new statutes that do not require norming so explicitly. 
Nonetheless, the agency still regularly engages in norming, though not 
to the same degree as in the late 1960s. Consider, for example, a 2011 
NHTSA rule meant to protect automobile occupants from being 
thrown from their cars during accidents.127 In 2005, Congress passed a 
 
 122. See HOWARD A. HEFFRON, RICHARD J. MEDALIE, STEPHAN KURZMAN & MARIAN R. 
PEARLMAN, FEDERAL CONSUMER SAFETY LEGISLATION: A STUDY OF THE SCOPE AND 
ADEQUACY OF THE AUTOMOBILE SAFETY, FLAMMABLE FABRICS, TOYS, AND HAZARDOUS 
SUBSTANCES PROGRAMS 1 (1970). 
 123. Id. at 56–59. 
 124. Id. at 60; see also MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 2, at 70 (“It was also becoming clear 
that public regulation had been largely ineffectual in forcing automotive technology.”). 
 125. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act § 103(h), 80 Stat. at 720. 
 126. MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 2, at 78. 
 127. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Ejection Mitigation; Phase-In Reporting 
Requirements; Incorporation by Reference, 76 Fed. Reg. 3212 (Jan. 19, 2011) (to be codified at 
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law aimed at preventing deaths from accidents in which automobiles 
flipped or rolled over, sometimes referred to as “rollover crashes.”128 
That law directed the DOT to “initiate rulemaking proceedings, for the 
purpose of establishing rules or standards that will reduce vehicle 
rollover crashes and mitigate deaths and injuries associated with such 
crashes,”129 and, like the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, required that those 
standards be “practicable.”130 
Rollover accidents can become particularly deadly if automobile 
passengers and drivers who are not wearing seatbelts are thrown from 
the vehicle through a window. NHTSA thus set out to promulgate 
regulations that would keep automobile occupants inside of their 
vehicles even if they did not wear seatbelts. There were two potential 
technologies: side curtain airbags, which would deploy in the event of 
a crash and hold occupants inside the automobile; and advanced 
lamination techniques for automobile glass (“advanced glazing,” in 
industry parlance) that would prevent window glass from shattering on 
impact.131 These two technologies are complementary, and the agency 
could have mandated both.132 Nonetheless, it opted to require only the 
former—the installation of side curtain airbags.133 
Although the agency does not admit as much, norming appears to 
be a significant part of the reason that it elected to require only airbags 
and not advanced glazing as well. By the agency’s calculation, 55 
percent of Model Year 2011 automobiles were already equipped with 
side curtain airbags that would trigger in the event of a rollover 
accident.134 Even some much older automobiles met the regulatory 
standards, including the 2004 Honda Accord135 and the 2003 Toyota 
 
49 C.F.R. pts. 571, 585). 
 128. See Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for 
Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59, Title X, § 10301(a), 119 Stat. 1144, 1939 (2005). 
 129. 49 U.S.C. § 30128(a) (2012). 
 130. Id. § 30111(b)(3). 
 131. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Ejection Mitigation; Phase-In Reporting 
Requirements; Incorporation by Reference, 76 Fed. Reg. at 3213–15. 
 132. See NHTSA, OFFICE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION, FINAL 
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: FMVSS NO. 226 EJECTION MITIGATION 135 n.164 (2011).  
 133. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Ejection Mitigation; Phase-In Reporting 
Requirements; Incorporation by Reference, 76 Fed. Reg. at 3212. To be precise, the agency set a 
safety standard—based upon what would happen to a vehicle occupant subject to a crash of a 
particular level of force—that could be met by installing only the airbag technology, rather than 
both technologies in tandem. 
 134. See NHTSA, supra note 132, at 46. 
 135. See id. at 136. 
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Camry.136 Model Year 2011 automobiles typically arrived on the 
market in fall 2010, and the regulation was not set to take effect until 
September 2014, around the time that Model Year 2015 automobiles 
would be released.137 Accordingly, it is likely that by September 2014, 
many more than 55 percent of automobiles would have included the 
appropriate type of airbag.138 By contrast, advanced glazing was far less 
common within the industry.139 
The comments that the DOT received are instructive. Automobile 
manufacturers and their trade groups—including the Alliance of 
Automobile Manufacturers, the Association of International 
Automobile Manufacturers, and firms such as Ford and General 
Motors—were generally supportive of the new rule.140 The 
manufacturers complained that the regulations were somewhat too 
stringent,141 which is to be expected; if the regulation had been weaker, 
even more than 55 percent of existing automobiles would already have 
been in compliance. But they generally favored the agency’s decision 
to require only airbags and not advanced glazing as well.142 Some 
comments were explicit on this point: “Ford commented that side 
glazing retention in real-world rollover crashes is random and 
unpredictable and expressed the belief that FMVSS No. 226 should be 
focused on rollover-activated side curtain technology . . . .”143 
 
 136. See id. at 137. 
 137. See id. at 46. 
 138. The agency did note that as few as 53 percent of the currently deployed airbags would be 
fully effective per the terms of the regulation. Accordingly, only 29 percent of existing 
automobiles would require no modifications to become compliant with the regulation. Id. at 112–
13. Nonetheless, the other 26 percent of automobiles with curtain airbags that were not fully 
compliant would likely only require minor modifications in order to make them compliant. 
 139. John D. Rowell, The Sordid History of Auto Safety Glass, HG.ORG 
https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/the-sordid-history-of-auto-safety-glass-19112 [https://perma.cc/ 
E48A-2F34]. DOT’s regulatory impact analysis seems to imply that no new cars would have 
advanced glazing without additional regulation because the costs and benefits of glazing are based 
on adding it to all 16.6 million new light vehicles that are sold annually. See NHTSA, supra note 
132, at 120–21.  
 140. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Ejection Mitigation; Phase-In Reporting 
Requirements; Incorporation by Reference, 76 Fed. Reg. 3212, 3220 (Jan. 19, 2011) (to be codified 
at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571, 585). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. On the other side, both consumer-oriented public interest groups (including Public 
Citizen) and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (an insurance-funded research 
organization) argued that the regulation should have required or incentivized manufacturers to 
add advanced glazing as a complement to airbags. Id. at 3221. These groups presumably possess 
far less political clout than the nation’s automakers in combination.  
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The regulation easily passed a cost-benefit analysis: the DOT 
projected approximately $2.3 billion in benefits (based upon 
preventing 373 fatalities and 476 serious injuries per year) against only 
$507 million in costs.144 This is not surprising. Norming will often lead 
to regulations that pass cost-benefit tests, precisely because lagging 
firms are only being asked to install technology that leading firms have 
already validated. The question is whether the DOT could have 
generated even greater net benefits by requiring advanced glazing in 
addition to side curtain airbags. Here, the evidence is less certain; the 
agency did not offer a precise estimate of the costs and benefits of 
advanced glazing.145 But the agency’s imprecise calculations suggest 
that mandating advanced glazing in addition to curtain airbags 
plausibly could have increased the regulation’s net benefits.146 
In sum, the DOT selected a regulatory standard that was probably 
weaker than cost-benefit analysis would recommend and had already 
been adopted by more than half of the industry (and was therefore 
supported by the industry). This suggests that the agency was engaged 
in norming, and that reliance on norming, as opposed to some other 
type of decision procedure, may have led the agency to promulgate a 
suboptimal regulation. 
III.  NORMING: COSTS AND BENEFITS 
A. The Case for Norming 
While we are skeptical that norming is a proper method for agency 
regulation, we begin by sketching out a possible defense of it. To fix 
intuitions, imagine an industry that consists of a large number of firms. 
The firms sell to consumers who are mostly different from the residents 
who live near their production facilities; only the residents are harmed 
 
 144. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Ejection Mitigation; Phase-In Reporting 
Requirements; Incorporation by Reference, 76 Fed. Reg. at 3293 tbls.42, 43 & 45. These are the 
cost-benefit figures at a 3 percent discount rate. Using a 7 percent discount rate, the benefits are 
slightly lower but still much greater than the costs. 
 145. The agency was unable to estimate exact costs and benefits for advanced glazing on the 
rear window and sunroof because it was unsure of the effectiveness of such glazing in preventing 
ejection from a vehicle in the event of a crash. NHTSA, supra note 132, at 115–34. The DOT did 
calculate the expected number of lives saved and costs of using advanced glazing on the front and 
side windows (along with air bags). According to the DOT’s estimates, advanced glazing on those 
windows would cost $1.153 billion and save 83 lives. Compare id. at 159, Table VI-2 (lives saved 
with airbags only) with id. at 164-65, Table VII-5 (lives saved with airbags plus advanced glazing). 
The DOT does not compute a CBA for advanced glazing on the side and front windows alone. 
 146. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
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when the firms pollute. Assume that the firms are identical in all 
respects except two. First, every firm emits a different amount of 
pollution into the atmosphere in the course of manufacturing consumer 
goods. We can imagine the firms arrayed along a horizontal line, from 
the most-polluting firms to the least-polluting firms, with most of the 
firms clustered in the middle around the mean level of emissions. 
Assume that the firms differ with respect to the quality, sophistication, 
and hence expense of the pollution-control technology they use; the 
firms that have invested more in that technology emit less pollution. 
Second, every firm charges a price for its products that is inversely 
related to the amount of pollution that it emits. The most-polluting 
firm charges the lowest price; the least-polluting firm charges the 
highest price; and so on. Accordingly, we assume that the cost savings 
that a firm enjoys when it avoids reducing emissions are passed on to 
the consumer in the form of lower prices. 
Before we analyze regulatory approaches, we should address an 
obvious question, which is how such variation is possible in the first 
place. In a perfectly competitive market, consumers would buy from 
the most-polluting firms because they offer the lowest prices and the 
consumers are not affected by the pollution; the other firms would go 
out of business. But in a more realistic setting, variation is not 
surprising. If the price differences are small, consumers might not be 
influenced by them, and prefer instead to buy from trusted brands or 
convenient outlets. Some firms might enjoy market power because of 
their location or other advantages. The firms might vary because they 
have installed pollution-control technologies at different times, have 
gambled with technologies that turned out to perform better than or 
worse than average, or are managed differently. Variation in state tort 
law and regulation may also account for differences in the firms’ 
pollution-control technologies. 
Let us first consider how a regulator would approach this industry 
if it uses cost-benefit analysis. The regulator would ask whether the 
higher-quality pollution control equipment generates benefits greater 
than the costs. The benefits accrue to nearby residents who inhale the 
pollution, while the costs are borne by consumers who buy the 
products. Notably, the regulator would not pay attention to the 
variation among firms with respect to the pollution control technology 
that they use and the amount of pollution they emit. The cost-benefit 
analysis could reveal that even the least-polluting firm pollutes too 
much—the harms to residents exceed the benefits to consumers. If so, 
the regulator would issue a regulation that burdens all the firms, 
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requiring all of them to install more technology and reduce emissions 
to a level below the best-performing firm. Alternatively, the cost-
benefit analysis could also reveal that none of the firms should be 
regulated—even the worst-performing firm produces benefits greater 
than the costs. Any other level of regulatory stringency is also possible. 
By contrast, an agency that followed the norming approach would 
use the distribution itself to set the level of strictness mandated by the 
regulation. For example, this could involve requiring all firms to use 
the quality of pollution-control technology, or emit pollution, at a level 
at least as good as that of the median firm. Of course, one could 
imagine other approaches roughly consistent with the idea of norming. 
The regulator might choose a level of stringency that affects only the 
bottom X percent of firms—where X could be five, ten, seventy-five, 
or any other number.147 The idea of norming does not tell us how much 
of the tail of the distribution is targeted; only that the regulator takes 
the distribution as given and targets some portion of the tail. 
Under what conditions could norming be superior to cost-benefit 
analysis? The major challenge of cost-benefit analysis is estimating 
valuations. The regulator must value both the benefits of a regulation 
(in our example, health benefits, including saved medical costs) and the 
costs (in our example, the cost of pollution-control technology). Both 
types of valuation can be difficult. Many benefits of regulation are hard 
to monetize, including avoided mortality risk, intangible health 
benefits like fewer headaches, and enhancement of natural beauty. The 
cost of regulation also can be hard to estimate because technology can 
change rapidly, causing compliance costs to fall. When an agency 
engages in norming, it avoids having to estimate costs and benefits, 
which also means it avoids the risk that calculation errors will cause it 
to issue a regulation that is too strong or too weak. 
Still, norming can be superior to cost-benefit analysis only if there 
is reason to believe that the firm above the regulatory threshold is 
emitting the optimal amount of pollution, or at least that it is closer to 
the optimum than a regulator using cost-benefit analysis could get. But 
why would firms voluntarily incur costs to reduce pollution below the 
profit-maximizing level? There would need to be a source of constraint 
on pollution independent of federal regulation. We can imagine such 
constraint arising from several sources. 
First, the variation could come from state law. Imagine that in 
 
 147. Or conceivably, 100. 
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most, but not all states, an optimal (or at least very good) tort or 
regulatory regime prevails. If most firms are in the states with the 
optimal tort regime, then most firms will issue the optimal amount of 
pollution. The firms that issue an excessive amount of pollution are 
located in the states with suboptimal tort law. A federal regulation that 
required all firms to use the pollution control technology of the median 
firm, or to emit no more pollution than the median firm, would 
eliminate the inefficient outliers in the spirit of norming. Here, the 
national regulator may lack the information needed to conduct cost-
benefit analysis but can piggyback off the independent efforts of state 
courts and regulators around the country.148 
Second, the variation could come from market structure. Imagine 
a form of market segmentation in which most firms offer reasonable-
quality products to most consumers while a few firms offer low-quality 
products to unsophisticated consumers. Such segmentation occurs in 
many industries. For example, in credit markets banks tend to offer 
higher-quality products—lower-risk loans that are adequately 
explained—than do some mortgage brokers, payday lenders, and other 
bottom feeders, which offer complex and risky products that lure 
unsophisticated borrowers. A regulator could believe that by 
mandating the terms and product features of the best firms, it will drive 
out of business the firms that pose unreasonable risks to consumers. 
Third, the variation could come from management choices made 
under different levels of information, and reflecting different risk 
preferences among managers and investors. Imagine, for example, that 
entrepreneurs set up exchanges or clearinghouses in order to act as 
intermediaries among various sophisticated market agents. The 
entrepreneurs must choose various features of their business, for 
example, the magnitude of margin requirements. In making this choice, 
the entrepreneur must balance the costs and benefits of its customers. 
Different entrepreneurs make different judgments, resulting in 
variation across institutions. A regulator who thinks that uniformity is 
desirable might reasonably believe that the median balance is optimal, 
and accordingly mandate it by regulation.149 
 
 148. An important case of this involves preemption, when federal regulators issue regulations 
that preempt diverse state legal regimes. 
 149. The idea is formalized in the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which has been widely discussed 
in the academic literature. See generally Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The 
Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5 
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2003) (discussing the theorem); Paul H. Edelman, On Legal 
Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 327 (2002) (same); Eric A. 
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In many cases, we observe private associations choosing to 
mandate standards among their members. When they do so, they 
typically observe a distribution of practices and choose a standard 
somewhere in the middle. The familiar ethical codes of conduct among 
lawyers, accounting standards, medical standards, and so on illustrate 
this approach. The regulator may believe that the association chooses 
a standard that protects the reputation of the industry and endorse it 
through regulation because the association is in a better position to 
assess benefits and costs than the regulator is. The regulator thus 
converts the industry standard into a licensing requirement or other 
independent source of law. 
Generalizing from these examples, we conclude that norming may 
be superior to cost-benefit analysis when (1) estimating costs and 
benefits is extremely hard for the government; and (2) the industry in 
question either does not create negative externalities (in the area in 
which the regulator regulates) or is forced to internalize them by other 
sources of law, considerations of reputation, and so on. When these 
conditions are met, the argument for norming boils down to a claim 
that the large number of firms that cluster around the median are more 
likely to have made a correct judgment than the small number of 
outliers. The regulator thus uses the pattern of behavior of the firms as 
a source of information that is more easily obtainable than the 
information needed to estimate the costs and benefits of particular 
technologies. 
B. The Problems with Norming 
While the case for norming may be sound on theoretical grounds, 
we are skeptical that the empirical conditions for norming prevail in 
many markets. We are also concerned that norming may cause 
independent problems, such as cartelization, and may be susceptible to 
political misuse. We leave political misuse for Section C and address 
the other issues here. 
Costs and benefits. The case for norming rests on the difficulty of 
estimating costs and benefits. While in some quarters commentators 
remain skeptical about cost-benefit analysis,150 this decision procedure 
has become routine in government because of its many advantages. 
The quantification problem arises for many reasons: some benefits 
(e.g., longevity, natural beauty) are hard to measure; so are some costs, 
 
Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131 (2006) (same).  
 150. See, e.g., Coates, supra note 17, at 890. 
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because of the speed with which technology changes; and it is often 
difficult to trace out chains of causation from regulation to business 
behavior. Yet these problems are ubiquitous in ordinary life—for 
businesses as much as for regulators—and quantification remains the 
standard procedure. When uncertainty exists, one makes rough rather 
than precise estimates. And when uncertainty is high enough, the 
normal solution is not to adopt some other procedure for regulation 
but to refrain from regulating in the first place. Regulators, like 
businesses, can reduce uncertainty by investing in research. 
If businesses use cost-benefit analysis (often referred to as net 
present value analysis in the corporate context) to evaluate projects, 
then regulators can, too. Agencies can also put in place institutional 
procedures that allow them to revisit cost-benefit analyses that rely on 
uncertain estimates and revise them as necessary, learning from 
experience.151 
Externalities; market regulation. Our second basis for skepticism is 
that most regulation is necessary because of the problem of 
externalities, and norming is a particularly unwise approach to 
regulating externalities. Take the paradigmatic case of pollution. Firms 
pollute in order to keep their costs down. Because the harm is borne 
by third parties, the firms do not face any penalty in the absence of a 
legal response, except possibly a reputational penalty if the pollution is 
discovered.152 If the legal or regulatory response is itself based on the 
activity of the median firm, then the law will allow harmful levels of 
pollution rather than stopping it. While the norming regulator may shut 
down the worst polluters, it would do much better using cost-benefit 
analysis if the median or above-median firms also emit excessively high 
levels of pollution, as one would predict from normal market 
incentives. 
In the previous section, we provided some scenarios in which state 
law or reputational sanctions prevent the worse kind of abuse, and so 
norming could be justified.153 But the scenarios do not seem likely to 
prevail in practice. A major reason for federal regulation is that state 
regulation is inadequate. Reputational sanctions are also typically 
 
 151. For a discussion, see Masur & Posner, Unquantified Benefits, supra note 18, at 125–36.  
 152. Howard Gensler, The Economics of Pollution Taxes, 10 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. 
L. 1, 4 (1995) (“Pollution is an externality. That is to say, pollution is a legitimate expense of the 
production process which ought to be borne by the manufacturer. The parties to the transaction 
do not face all the costs because the manufacturer avoids the pollution clean-up costs.”).  
 153. Except possibly in the case of regulations designed to preempt inconsistent state law. 
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weak. The best case for norming arises when the industry does not 
generate externalities, but since the major reason for regulation is to 
counter externalities, this best case will not arise very often. Exchanges 
and clearinghouses, for example, are regulated because of the negative 
external effects caused by financial crises, which the collapse of an 
exchange or clearinghouse could spark. If these institutions did not 
produce negative externalities, there would be little reason to regulate 
them in the first place. 
Cartelization. Many economists believe that firms have used 
regulation to raise barriers to entry into their industry.154 A common 
interpretation of licensing requirements, for example, is that they 
mandate business practices that most firms in the industry already use, 
while forcing out marginal firms or excluding new entrants who can 
offer the same goods and services at lower prices if they are not 
required to engage in the median or normal practice.155 If the business 
practice is unnecessary and undesired by consumers, the effect of the 
regulation is to reduce competition, which benefits incumbent firms 
while harming consumers. Because the norming approach does not 
involve direct evaluation of the benefits and costs of existing business 
practices, the regulator may end up mandating business practices that 
reduce competition. Indeed, as we argue in Section C, this may explain 
why norming seems to be a regulatory approach that businesses 
support. 
Indeterminacy. As our case studies illustrate, norming is merely an 
umbrella term that covers a vast range of regulatory stringency. The 
standard does not itself tell the regulator whether to regulate at the 
50th percentile, the 1st percentile, or the 99th percentile. One can 
narrow down the approach by making certain assumptions. If, for 
example, the firms in the industry do not generate externalities on 
others, there is a theoretical reason for using the 50th percentile.156 But 
if the firms do generate externalities, a higher percentile should be 
used. The case studies also show another problem: how does the 
 
 154. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 
3, 5 (1971); Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 367 (1988).  
 155. John Blevins, License to Uber: Using Administrative Law to Fix Occupational Licensing, 
64 UCLA L. REV. 844, 855–56 (2017) (describing this line of critique of licensing and cataloguing 
the many individuals and parties who have advanced it). 
 156. This conclusion would follow from the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Adrian Vermeule, 
Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 4–9 (2009) (describing the 
theorem and observing that “as the number of members in the group increases, the probability 
that a majority vote of the group is correct tends towards certainty”). 
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regulator identify the behavior that should be “normed”? For capital 
regulation, regulators initially relied upon simple capital ratios based 
only on the proportion of equity to assets. As it became clear that these 
ratios did not accurately measure the risk level of banking because they 
ignore the riskiness of the underlying assets and liabilities, regulators 
moved to a more complicated system.157 In the environmental 
examples, it was never clear why the EPA chose one measure of 
pollution rather than another. We suspect that agencies resolved both 
of these issues by relying either on an informal cost-benefit test or 
succumbing to pressure from industry or other interest groups. 
C. The Political Appeal of Norming 
This brings us to the biggest concern with norming: that it is an 
appealing way to regulate from a political rather than a social 
standpoint. Agencies may choose to norm rather than conduct cost-
benefit analysis or another procedure because norming is easier, less 
vulnerable to judicial and public scrutiny, and less likely to provoke 
political opposition from industry. There are a number of reasons for 
this. 
First, as we have observed, the major advantage of norming is that 
it puts a low burden on the resources of agency decisionmakers. Rather 
than perform studies of the costs and benefits of various technologies, 
the regulator need only survey industry practice. While the limited 
resources of regulators may justify the use of shortcuts from time to 
time, this particular shortcut is extreme. 
Second, norming may be appealing because it shields regulations 
from judicial review. Because norming puts less of a burden on 
regulators than cost-benefit analysis does, regulators that use norming 
are also less likely to make identifiable errors that can be used against 
them when regulations are challenged in court. In the case of cost-
benefit analysis, regulators can be (and have been) criticized for using 
inconsistent discount factors and valuations; ignoring relevant 
academic studies; underestimating costs and exaggerating benefits; and 
so on.158 Because there is an established methodology for performing 
cost-benefit analysis, industry can retain credible experts to identify 
these errors.159 While courts rarely strike down regulations due to 
 
 157. See Posner, supra note 108, at 1854–56, 1880–81. 
 158. Masur & Posner, Unquantified Benefits, supra note 18, at 112–13, 126–27. 
 159. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4 41 (2003), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf. [https:// 
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errors in cost-benefit analysis,160 the litigation risk is real, and a 
significant preoccupation for agencies.161 
By contrast, when an agency engages in norming, the only way for 
the regulator to err is to mischaracterize the distribution of industry 
practices, or to choose a threshold that is inconsistent with the statute 
or the arbitrary and capricious standard of the Administrative 
Procedure Act.162 There is nothing complicated about the first task. If, 
for example, the relevant variable is the expense of the safety 
equipment that has been installed in factories, or the amount of 
emissions, then the regulator will be able to rely on either publicly 
available data or data collected from the industry, and it is simply a 
matter of describing the distribution. 
The choice of the regulatory threshold is more complicated. An 
agency could, in principle, set the threshold exactly at the mean, near 
the bottom of the tail, or nearly anywhere else on the distribution. The 
issue here is that since there is no technical way to do so—no 
established formula or procedure that provides a baseline against 
which errors could be identified—it would be difficult for a challenger 
to explain to a court why the chosen regulatory threshold is 
improper.163 
 
perma.cc/N3VF-VFWL]. 
 160. But see Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (vacating 
Exchange Act Rule 14a-11 because the SEC failed to adequately consider the rule’s effect on 
“efficiency, competition, and capital formation” and thus failed to “apprise itself . . . of the 
economic consequences of a proposed regulation”); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 
1201, 1212 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the EPA failed to give adequate weight to the statutory 
mandate that it promulgate “the least burdensome, reasonable regulation required to protect the 
environment adequately” and remanding the regulation to the agency). 
 161. See generally Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 289 (2013) (reviewing the impact of a series of cases invalidating 
SEC rules on economic analysis grounds and raising the bar for such analysis in regulations). 
 162. Agency decisions are reviewed by the courts to determine if they are “arbitrary [and] 
capricious,” a type of review that is sometimes referred to as “hard look review.” See 5 U.S.C. 
§  706(2)(a) (2012); Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
42–43 (1983) (describing how the arbitrary and capricious standard is applied).  
 163. However, in an early case a court struck down a capital regulation, and in doing so put 
its finger exactly on the problem with norming: 
Mr. Vaez’s testimony [that the Bank “ranked near the bottom of its peer group in all 
of the equity related ratios”] does not demonstrate a correlation between the Bank 
ranking towards the bottom of its peer [sic] in an analysis of equity related ratios and a 
finding that the Bank’s capital level was unsafe and unsound. Obviously, this peer 
group analysis indicates that a majority of banks, approximately the same size as 
Bellaire Bank, maintain a higher level of equity than Bellaire Bank. This analysis may 
indicate that further investigation is needed. It does not, by itself, prove that the Bank’s 
capital level was unsafe and unsound. It is very possible that all the banks in the peer 
group are maintaining a safe and sound capital level. Without a connection between 
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Third, because norming tends to result in low regulatory burdens 
for most of the regulated industry, industry opposition is likely to be 
muted, relative to more aggressive regulatory approaches like cost-
benefit analysis. This is a version of regulatory capture, in which 
agencies make decisions so as not to upset the interests of dominant 
members of the regulated industry.164 In the area of financial 
regulation, for example, it is well known that banks tend not to 
challenge regulations. While commentators have argued that banks 
refrain from challenging regulations because they fear retaliation from 
regulators,165 another reason might be that the banks believe that the 
regulations actually serve their interests or are weak enough to be 
tolerated. The automobile industry’s largely positive response to 
NHTSA’s side curtain airbag regulation offers a similar example.166 
In sum, while norming may be justified under narrow conditions, 
agencies might use it more generally because it is easy to do and 
protects them from opposition and scrutiny. 
IV.  NORMING ELSEWHERE IN THE LAW 
While the administrative state is the subject of our article, it is not 
the only locus of norming. The same political dynamics that make 
norming attractive to regulators can make it similarly attractive to the 
courts. In particular, judicial decisions that force wholesale changes on 
state or private actors can engender significant political opposition.167 
Norming, by contrast, limits political opposition to a court’s decision 
 
the peer group analysis and a finding of unsafe and unsound capital levels, therefore, 
the peer group analysis does not support the Comptroller’s finding that the Bank’s 
capital level was unsafe and unsound. 
First Nat’l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 686 (5th Cir. 1983). 
However, such cases appear to be rare. 
 164. See Daniel Carpenter and David A. Moss, Introduction, in PREVENTING REGULATORY 
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 1, 13 (Daniel Carpenter & 
David A. Moss eds., 2014); Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. 
ECON. POL’Y 203, 216 (2006); cf. Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Funds and the Regulatory Capture of 
the SEC, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 701, 749 (2017) (criticizing the SEC as “complicit” in the mutual 
fund industry’s unchecked expansion, leading to “[i]ndividual investors . . . being systematically 
under-informed and overcharged billions”). 
 165. See, e.g., Scott Polakoff, Fear of Retaliation Stifles Banks’ Appeals to Regulators, AM. 
BANKER (Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/fear-of-retaliation-stifles-
banks-appeals-to-regulators [https://perma.cc/3AMQ-HWT8]. 
 166. See supra Part II.D. 
 167. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should 
Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 155 (2007) (describing the potential for outrage directed at 
judicial decisions). 
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by making allies of those who are already in compliance with the new 
standard. Accordingly, we should expect to witness norming across 
multiple areas of judge-made law. In the sections that follow, we 
describe some of those areas and evaluate the advantages and 
disadvantages of norming in judge-made law. 
A. Constitutional Law 
Many constitutional scholars believe that the Supreme Court 
engages in a procedure akin to norming. In many cases, when people 
challenge a law of a particular state, the Court surveys the relevant laws 
of all the states. If few or no other states have enacted such a law, the 
court might find in this pattern a “consensus” on certain constitutional 
values. The “outlier” state is ruled out of constitutional bounds, and its 
law is struck down. 
This procedure is best known from Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence. The Eighth Amendment bars criminal punishments that 
are “cruel and unusual.”168 The Court has ruled that these terms are to 
be understood in light of “evolving standards of decency,”169 evidence 
of which is supplied by the practices of the states and even of foreign 
countries. For example, in Coker v. Georgia,170 the Court struck down 
a law that imposed the death penalty on those convicted of raping an 
adult woman. After pointing out that “[a]t no time in the last 50 years 
have a majority of the States authorized death as a punishment for 
rape,” and pointing to other indications that most states disapprove of 
this practice, the Court ruled that the punishment is cruel and unusual, 
and hence unconstitutional.171 Following the same style of reasoning, 
the Court has struck down laws that impose the death penalty on 
children172 and intellectually disabled people173 who commit capital 
crimes. 
Some scholars have argued that, in Judge Easterbrook’s words, 
the Court “obliterates outliers” in many other areas of its 
jurisprudence, including equal protection and substantive due 
 
 168. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
 169. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 
(1958)). 
 170. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 171. Id. at 593–97. 
 172. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005). 
 173. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
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process174 Consider the contraception ban struck down in Griswold v. 
Connecticut175 or the sodomy law struck down in Lawrence v. Texas.176 
In both of these cases, the Court took an outlier-extirpation approach, 
ruling against a single state or small number of states whose laws 
deviated in significant measure from the laws of other states.177 It is 
possible to see this type of logic in the Court’s procedural due process178 
and Second Amendment179 cases as well. The Court’s occasional 
reference to the laws of other countries also fits this pattern. When 
deciding Eighth Amendment or due process cases, the Court 
sometimes surveys the laws of other countries—particularly developed 
democracies—to ascertain whether American law is an outlier.180 This 
is norming of a more stringent type, where the U.S. is normed to a high 
standard set by just a few countries. It is the constitutional version of 
the EPA’s “average of the best” standard. 
This practice can be compared with other constitutional methods. 
Originalist scholars, for example, argue that a court should strike down 
statutes that violate the original understanding of the Constitution.181 
It is irrelevant whether any, many, or most states have similar statutes. 
If certain gun control laws violate the Second Amendment, it is 
irrelevant whether most states have those gun control laws: they must 
all be struck down. Another standard view, according to which courts 
 
 174. The phrase comes from Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 349, 370 (1992); see also Fourteenth Amendment–Due Process Clause–Criminal Procedure–
Nelson v. Colorado, 131 HARV. L. REV. 283, 292 n.88 (2017) (describing the same process).  
 175. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).  
 176. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 177. Cf. Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 
VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996). (“Frequently the Court takes a strong national consensus and imposes it 
on relatively isolated outliers.”). For a recent critical discussion, see generally Justin Driver, 
Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 929 (2014). 
 178. E.g., Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 48 (1996) (arguing that the fact that one-fifth of 
states apply a procedural rule militates in favor of its constitutionality). 
 179. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 246 (2008) (arguing that District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), is best 
seen as akin to Griswold because both cases invalidated national outlier policies).  
 180. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (“Our determination that the death 
penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark 
reality that the United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official 
sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”). But see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576 (“To the 
extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it should be noted that the 
reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere.”). 
 181. See generally BRYAN A. GARNER & ANTONIN G. SCALIA, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012) (explaining and advocating for originalism in 
constitutional interpretation).  
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should protect minorities shut out of the political process,182 also rejects 
the relevance of frequency of such statutes. If most or even all states 
have laws that discriminate against racial or sexual minorities, for 
example, those laws are still unconstitutional. It would make no sense 
for a court committed to protecting minorities to uphold those laws, or 
limit itself to striking down the most discriminatory statutes in the very 
worst states while upholding less discriminatory statutes in the 
remaining states. 
The Court’s norming practice has been the topic of considerable 
debate, with a great deal of attention paid to whether the Court has 
applied the outlier-extirpation approach in a consistent and reasonable 
matter. On the merits of the procedure, many scholars seem skeptical. 
They argue that a consensus among the states does not necessarily 
reflect much about the views and constitutional values of the people, 
or even of the state legislatures.183 A few scholars have suggested that 
the Court’s approach could make sense.184 As Cass Sunstein puts it, 
“consensus may have epistemic value: if most people believe that X is 
true, X may well be true, certainly under favorable conditions.”185 If 
most states believe that executing intellectually disabled people is 
cruel, then it may well be cruel. 
As Sunstein’s comment suggests, the case for outlier-extirpation is 
informational, just as the case for norming is. The difference between 
the administrative and constitutional settings is that the regulators are 
mainly concerned with facts about the world—whether a type of 
pollution causes harms, for example—while in constitutional cases the 
focus is on moral or constitutional values.186 If such things as 
constitutional values exist, and if they are reflected in state legislation, 
then the Supreme Court may discover those values by observing the 
practices of states rather than relying on the possibly defective 
 
 182. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (1980) (advocating for a process-based approach of constitutional interpretation that 
balances majority representation and minority participation).  
 183. See Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
475, 520–23 (2005). 
 184. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY THE FOUNDING 
DOCUMENT DOESN’T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE 187–210 (2009); Posner & Sunstein, 
supra note 149, at 136 (“[T]he Jury Theorem formalizes the simple intuition that the practices of 
others provide relevant information, and that courts ought not to ignore such information.”). 
 185. Sunstein, supra note 179, at 265. 
 186. Facts also matter. For instance, it may be important to know whether the death penalty 
deters if that is relevant to the ultimate constitutional question. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 
149, at 145.  
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intuitions of the justices. The logic of information aggregation applies 
in both cases. 
The Court’s jurisprudence shows the benefits and limits of 
norming. On the one hand, the Court’s use of norming seems 
understandable because in many cases it has no external standard for 
evaluating the laws of the states. To the extent that these laws reflect 
information—about facts or values—they can reasonably be used as a 
source to derive a national standard if such a standard is called for. On 
the other hand, the Court’s approach is vulnerable to the objections 
that we have seen. If state legislatures do not independently reflect on 
the advisability of these laws before enacting them, or if states are not 
trying to arrive at socially optimal answers, the normative force of the 
pattern is questionable. 
A major difference between agency practice and judicial practice 
is that the agencies are far more concerned with behavior that 
generates externalities. Where, as we have discussed, a business 
practice causes harms to third parties, the regulator should try to stop 
that practice or at least restrain it. While the firm at the center of the 
distribution causes less harm than the outlier, both firms should be 
regulated. In contrast, most of the Supreme Court cases we have 
discussed do not involve externalities in such a straightforward way. If 
Connecticut bans contraception, it does not harm people in Oklahoma 
or California. There are other areas of the law that restrict states from 
imposing externalities on each other—for example, the dormant 
commerce clause, which blocks states from imposing trade barriers on 
each other. Because the states externalize costs through trade barriers, 
the outlier-extirpation approach would be unwise and does not appear 
to be used by the Court, as one would expect. 
B. Incorporation of Custom in the Common Law 
Another style of norming occurs in pockets of the common law 
where courts derive legal standards from the customary practices of 
firms. In tort law, for example, courts frequently use custom to 
determine the level of due care for the purpose of establishing whether 
a defendant acted negligently. Custom may supply evidence of due 
care, or even the standard itself.187 This is common in the area of 
medical malpractice, among many others, where doctors are held to the 
 
 187. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T. J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom 
in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1992) (arguing that custom should trump cost-benefit 
analysis in determining the standard of due care). 
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community standard rather than required to comply with an 
independent cost-benefit analysis.188 In contract law, courts sometimes 
use industry custom to fill in gaps or resolve ambiguities in contracts.189 
Incorporation of custom also sometimes occurs in statutory 
interpretation, especially when statutes are vague and subject to 
judicial elaboration over time. In intellectual property law, industry 
standards are used to determine the meaning of fair use and the point 
at which an invention becomes obvious,190 among other concepts.191 
Examples in common and statutory law can be easily multiplied. 
Incorporation of custom can be contrasted to other methods for 
resolving common-law disputes. In tort law, a defendant’s behavior can 
be subject to a cost-benefit test, like the Hand formula. In The T.J. 
Hooper,192 Judge Hand himself rejected custom as a defense because 
he believed that industry customs will be insufficient to protect third 
parties.193 In contract law, judges may prefer to rely on more traditional 
methods of contractual interpretation, such as scrutinizing the 
evidentiary record for the intentions of the parties, which may deviate 
from custom. These approaches can lead to different levels of liability. 
In tort law, if an industry adopts a common practice that externalizes 
harm on third parties, then a court that defers to custom will hold liable 
only the worst offenders, while a court that uses a cost-benefit test may 
end up holding liable everyone or nearly everyone in the industry. 
In theory, custom can be efficient, or otherwise desirable, but even 
its major defenders agree that the conditions under which it is efficient 
are limited.194 When an industry consists of similarly situated agents 
who enter into repeated interactions with each other—trading goods 
and services, for example—it is easy to see why, as a matter of theory, 
 
 188. E.g., Bobo v. Bryant, 706 So. 2d 763, 764 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (“The only issue on appeal 
is whether Bobo produced the substantial evidence required to substantiate her claim that Dr. 
Bryant had breached the applicable community standard of care.”). 
 189. See Lisa Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 65–66 (2015) 
(presenting an empirical study of cases dealing with trade usage under the Uniform Commercial 
Code).  
 190. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007). 
 191. See generally Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual 
Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899 (2007) (discussing the impact of custom on intellectual property 
law and challenging its widespread incorporation). 
 192. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). 
 193. See id. at 740 (“[T]here are precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard 
will not excuse their omission.”). 
 194. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES 283–84 (1991); Epstein, supra note 187, at 32. 
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the customs they adopt might be welfare-maximizing for the group. But 
custom is less likely to be welfare-maximizing if the agents have 
different levels of wealth, market power, and sophistication, and 
especially when their customary behavior externalizes costs on third 
parties.195 An industry “custom” of discharging toxic waste in public 
waterways is not likely to be desirable from the social perspective. 
Incorporation of custom into the common law offers an analogy 
to norming in agency regulation. In both cases, the legal decisionmaker 
uses community standards—the “norms” of business behavior—to 
determine legal standards, and in doing so targets outliers while sparing 
the normal or above-normal firm from liability. Given that regulatory 
agencies have inherited many of the functions of the common law 
courts, it may be unsurprising that regulatory agencies have adopted a 
practice that has been common among those courts. But this is not to 
say that the practice is wise. 
CONCLUSION 
Many regulators engage in norming—setting regulatory standards 
on the basis of what existing firms are already doing. In some cases, 
norming is explicitly written into the statutes that authorize regulatory 
action; in other cases, agencies have adopted norming as a matter of 
their own discretion. In either case, the result is that agency regulation 
is often tethered closely to existing industry practice. 
It is possible to mount a defense of norming as appropriate agency 
practice. If firms within an industry are already self-regulating in some 
manner, that is a strong indication that the regulation will provide at 
least some health and safety benefits without unduly harming the 
industry. An agency process of norming and re-norming over time 
could act as a ratchet, increasing the level of regulatory stringency in a 
manner that consistently passes a cost-benefit test. If agencies are 
trying to ensure that they first do no harm to the industry, there is a lot 
to be said for norming. 
But norming is inferior to cost-benefit analysis. Norming unduly 
privileges the status quo; cost-benefit analysis does not. There is an 
irony in the fact that critics of cost-benefit analysis have long derided 
it as a tool used to block beneficial regulation.196 In fact, agencies 
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 196. See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit 
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themselves have hamstrung regulation by engaging in norming rather 
than following whatever regulatory course cost-benefit analysis would 
dictate. 
 
 
 
costs, and thus underregulation). 
